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REFLECTIONS ON UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
Laurence H. Tribe
The Papers in this Symposium serve up a savory blend of inquiries
into the epistemology, the politics, and what might be called the "ge-
nealogy" of "unenumerated rights" discourse in constitutional
thought and history. Its stimulating offerings present an enticing
smorgasbord, prepared with impressive skill. Only a boorish guest
would quibble over this chef's choice of recipe or that chef's choice
of presentation. Of greater interest to me than the particulars of the
cuisine on display are the seemingly shared premises and broad con-
clusions of its creators. They seem, by and large, to agree that they
are engaged in a quest for substances as elusive as manna, and they
appear, on the whole, to have decided that the objects of their as-
signed search have an awkward attribute in common: they don't
really exist.
Speaking as a student of the United States Constitution, I must
confess to a certain discomfort with any academic meal the first
course of which begins with either (1) the disarming proposition that
all rights, if one reads with sufficient care, are somewhere "enumer-
ated;" or (2) the equally unsettling proposition that no "rights," if one
is analytically rigorous about what to count as a right, can be "read"
from any fixed enumeration.
We can, of course, think ourselves into either of these opposing
corners, but talking in a language whose constitutive rules promi-
nently include the directive that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people,"1 precludes treating either category as
empty or illusory. The boundary between enumerated and unenu-
merated rights may be artificial or wobbly, and I have no doubt that
much may be learned by exploring the topic along that dimension,
but for purposes of this Comment I'm content to put those consid-
erations to one side.
Returning to the culinary image with which I began, I'm re-
minded of Ren6 Descartes' imaginary reply to the waiter who asked
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him whether he wished to have another bowl of soup. The last words
the great philosopher ever spoke, the apocryphal story has it, were
barely audible as he slumped face down into his vichyssoise: "I think
not."
In that spirit, I set aside for the time being a question over which
I've puzzled for some time: whether G6del's Theorem demonstrat-
ing the inevitable existence of true but unprovable mathematical
propositions might somehow translate into a parallel theorem about
the necessary existence of "unenumerated" rights-or whether the
irreducibly normative character of "rights talk" condemns any such
2translation to category error.
Because the existence of unenumerated rights is expressly posited
by our Constitution's text, I reserve for another time a discussion of
whether their existence is necessary or contingent. So too, of the ob-
servation in a number of the symposium papers that, in our constitu-
tional culture, calling a right "unenumerated" typically represents a
way of disparaging that right: for present purposes, that observation is
little more than a reminder that the Constitution's commands are at
times honored in the breach, given that the Ninth Amendment not
only precludes inferring non-existence but also bars disparagement.
Bracketing as outside our frame inquiries into the possible non-
existence of unenumerated rights or, conversely, into their possible
ubiquity-as well as investigations of the reasons for routinely treat-
ing non-enumeration as a constitutional liability and the patterns of
that supposed liability's attribution over the range of potentially eli-
gible candidates across time-what's left to say about these perplex-
ing entities?
My submission is that it will prove illuminating to lay bare the way
in which unenumerated rights appear to be constructed (or decon-
structed) from the available federal constitutional materials; to dis-
sect the several distinct architectures of rights that appear to emerge
from these processes; and to identify how relationships between the
former and the latter might suggest which asserted federal constitu-
tional rights are most comfortably described as "unenumerated"
when that tag serves not to put down their constitutional legitimacy
(or even to challenge their judicial enforceability) but simply to ex-
plore their anatomy and its morphology.
I speak here of "asserted federal constitutional rights" for two rea-
sons: first, to exclude as uninteresting for present purposes "constitu-
tional" rights that do not even purport to have supreme status under
2 David Hume might argue that such a translation would necessarily ignore the "is/ought"
distinction. But seeJANNA LEVIN, A MADMAN DREAMS OF TURING MACHINES (Alfred A. Knopf,
New York 2006) (exploring the moral and spiritual significance of G6del's incompleteness
theorems).
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Article VI of the Constitution as originating in federal rather than state
law; and second, to distinguish arguments to the effect that "r" is not
included within the undisputed right "R" from arguments to the ef-
fect that an ostensible right "R" is not truly a "right" at all but rather a
mere imposter.
As to the former exclusion, my intention is to reject out of hand as
implausibly trivial any reading of the Ninth Amendment that treats its
reference to "others retained by the people 3 as a mere reminder of
what the Tenth Amendment standing alone would in any event have
made plain-namely, that nothing in our Constitution's enumeration
of certain federal rights may be taken to negate the reserved power of
"the States respectively, or [of] the people 4 to create, recognize, and
protect rights under state law that are supreme vis-a-vis the ordinary
lawmaking processes of the respective states.
As to the latter exclusion, my purpose is to set aside as an uninter-
esting distraction the recognition that disputes over the precise reach
and coverage of an "enumerated" right such as the right to "freedom
of speech"-witness, for instance, the Supreme Court's close division
over the constitutionality of flag desecration statutes5 or over the in-
clusion of "obscenity," variously defined, as "protected speech"6-may
be every bit as persistent and troubling as disputes over the inclusion
of an entire category of claims, such as claims to reproductive or bod-
ily autonomy,7 in the catalogue of federally protected "rights." Both
sorts of disputes may indeed be sources of unending difficulty, but
maintaining a distinction between rights that are enumerated and
those that are not entails treating the first sort of difficulty as differ-
ent in kind from the difficulty posed by controversies over which
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4 Id. amend. X.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (holding in a 5-4 decision that
the Flag Protection Act of 1989 was unconstitutional as applied to the appellees); Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding in a 5-4 decision that the Texas statute banning flag
desecration was unconstitutional as applied to Johnson's expressive act of flag burning).
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002) (striking down provisions
of the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 because of overbreadth in restricting access to
protected expression); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973) (establishing First Amend-
ment standards for state laws proscribing the distribution of obscene materials).
7 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 567 (2003) ("The liberty protected by the Consti-
tution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice [to enter into physically inti-
mate personal relationships]."); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)
("It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an in-
terest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
("[The] right to privacy, [whether founded in the Ninth Amendment or the Fourteenth], is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law forbid-
ding the distribution of contraception to married couples infringed upon the marital relation-
ship protected by the zone of privacy guaranteed by the Bill of Rights).
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claims of right, albeit not grounded in any constitutional enumera-
tion, are legitimate and which are bogus.
To make headway within the domain that remains once those ex-
clusions are noted, I propose to describe four principal ways in which
rights may be extracted from, or defined with reference to, the con-
ventional materials of constitutional text, structure and history, and
the surrounding, arguably subordinate, interpretive sources repre-
sented by moral, political, social, and cultural philosophy and theory.
I call the four geometric, geodesic, geological, and monster-barring or slip-
peiy-slope avoiding.
GEOMETRIC. To envision the first model of rights-derivation, imag-
ine a process of arranging in sensible patterns the seemingly distinct
dots or points that represent the loci of "enumerated" rights and of
the spheres of decision and choice that the exercise of those rights
involves; of forming lines and planes that describe the relationships
among, and the connections between, those individual points; of fo-
cusing on the interconnecting vectors thus formed, with attention to
the directions and orientations of the resulting shapes; and then of
articulating the normative significance of the edges and faces of the
geometric forms that constitute the emergent array.
The famous "rational continuum" described in the first Justice
Harlan's Poe v. Ullman dissent should come to mind," as should the
inductive inference from lists of validated and invalidated govern-
ment measures, or the deductive extraction from theories of the
meaning of particular enumerated rights, of directions along which,
inputs on the basis of which, or ends toward which, government is
presumptively forbidden to move. Among the consequences of this
thought experiment's attention to forbidden directions of govern-
ment movement may be a subtle shift from the practice of identifying
rights principally as types of protected private acts to the practice of visu-
alizing rights as the mirror images of particular kinds of action forbidden to
the states or to the federal government. Especially instructive in this regard
are decisions like R.A. V v. City of St. Paul," the case in which Justice
Scalia insisted for a Court majority that, in identifying various catego-
ries of speech or conduct (e.g., "fighting words" or "threats") as "un-
protected," we must take care not to obscure the continuing rele-
vance of the First Amendment's proscriptions to government actions
that target instances within those "unprotected" categories for sup-
s 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated
points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and relig-
ion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures;
and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all sub-
stantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ... ").
9 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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pression along lines that discriminate in favor of some viewpoints and
against others.'"
Another embodiment of geometrically-derived unenumerated
rights-one perhaps camouflaged by its familiarity-is the practice of
enforcing against the states those individual rights that are deemed
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'" Common legal par-
lance often refers to this exercise as the "incorporation" of parts of
the Bill of Rights against the states, but that is surely a misnomer. It
would be misleading, for instance, to think of this process as one that
merely transcribes a series of discrete points from one domain (that
of rights against the federal government) to another (that of rights
against the several state governments). Rather, the process is one
that extrapolates to state action the lines or vectors that represent in-
ferred limits against types of government restriction, where those
lines in turn connect discrete instances of conduct enumerated as
impermissible for the federal government. Although Justice Black
famously urged that the Bill of Rights in its entirety be construed as
applicable to state action," the Court's actual practice was one of
gradual linear extrapolation, not an act of one-time boundary-
crossing exportation. As Justice Harlan emphasized in Duncan v.
Lousiana, "[t]he logically critical thing [in all instances of incorpora-
tion] was not that the rights had been found. in the Bill of Rights, but
that they were deemed, in the context of American legal history, to
be fundamental.'
3
10 Id. at 383-84 ("[Certain] categories of expression are 'not within the area of constitution-
ally protected speech,' .... [T]hese areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amend-
ment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation,
etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they
may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscrib-
able content. Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further con-
tent discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government. We recently acknowl-
edged this distinction ... in upholding New York's child pornography law, [where] we expressly
recognized that there was no 'question here of censoring a particular literary theme.. ").
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
12 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (ob-
jecting to the Court's assertion of the power to "expand and contract constitutional standards to
conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized decency'
and 'fundamental liberty and justice,'" and asserting that "one of the chief objects that the pro-
visions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were in-
tended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states").
13 391 U.S. 145, 179 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting); see also Adamson, 322 U.S. at 62 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) ("Of all [the judges to consider the Fourteenth Amendment since its pas-
sage], only one, who may respectfully be called an eccentric exception, ever indicated the belief
that the Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first eight Amendments
theretofore limiting only the Federal Government, and that due process incorporated those
eight Amendments as restrictions upon the powers of the States."). If this proposition requires
further support, one need only notice that the set of rights protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not coterminous with the protections of the Bill of
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Of course, the Court's extrapolations have not always withstood
the test of history, a point amply demonstrated by a now extinct, but
far from forgotten, progenitor of incorporation: freedom of contract
as the core of "liberty." Nonetheless, the Court's assertion that the
police power of the state failed to reach a zone of individual eco-
nomic ordering-first forged in pre-Erie diversity cases applying gen-
eral common law,1 4 and later applied as a federal constitutional prin-
ciple in the Lochner era 5-was similarly grounded on the assessment
that such a limitation "grow[s] out of the essential nature of all free
governments.16
More recently, the Court held in Lawrence v. Texas that a state's
ban on oral-genital and anal-genital contact between individuals of
the same sex denied "the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1 7 As I have elaborated elsewhere:
Lawrence's focus on the role of self-regulating relationships in American
liberty suggests that the "Trivial Pursuit" version of the due process "name
that liberty" game arguably validated by Glucksberg has finally given way to a
focus on the underlying pattern of self-government (rather than of state mi-
cromanagement) defined by the rights enumerated or implicit in the Consti-
tution or recognized by the landmark decisions construing it."
Lawrence did not repeat Lochners reliance on the arbitrary assumption
that the background common law regimes of the several states-
regimes that undeniably reinforced substantial inequalities in
power-furnished a constitutionally neutral baseline for unencum-
bered economic ordering.19 Nonetheless, while Lawrence avoided that
Rights. Compare Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931)
(declining to apply the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a civil jury trial to the states), with In
reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that, independent of the Bill of Rights, the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause protects defendants against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
1 See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 8-1, at 1340-42 (3d ed.
2000) (demonstrating that the willingness of federal courts to enforce contractual liberty
against the states prior to 1897 was limited to diversity cases).
15 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The general right to make a con-
tract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897))); Al/geyer, 165 U.S. at 591 ("To deprive the citizen of such a right [to contract] without
dueprocess of law is illegal.").
I Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1874).
17 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992)).
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893, 1936 (2004) (referencing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997)).
19 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923) ("The right of a person to
sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the
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particularly unsavory ingredient of the Lochner souffle, the recipes re-
flected by the two decisions had more in common than many of
Lochner's detractors who applaud Lawrence are inclined to concede.
Both decisions located in the ban on state deprivations of "liberty"
without "due process of law" a substantive limit on laws prohibiting
certain consensual relationships between adults that the individuals
immediately involved, and those most directly affected, deem to be in
their mutual interest; neither decision could point to any textual or
historic referent more determinate than the open-ended word "lib-
erty" as its constitutional compass; and both decisions rested on quite
specific, and manifestly controversial, normative theories about the
sorts of limits on freedom that will, in the long run, advance human
liberty and dignity and the sorts that will instead prove oppressive.
But there is at least this crucial difference between the two deci-
sions: Lawrence rested on descriptive premises both sides in the dis-
pute would have been hard-pressed to reject with respect to the most
profound expressions of the self in relation to others in our civiliza-
tion and perhaps in all imaginable human societies, whereas Lochner
presupposed a sharply contested set of assumptions about the osten-
sibly pre-political character of contractual and property arrangements
already widely believed, as of the time of the decision, to rest on de-
liberately constructed social and political structures and institutions
barely imaginable as essential features of the human condition.
GEODESIC. Think now of Buckminster Fuller's marvelous geodesic
domes-superstructures capable of enveloping and sheltering indi-
viduals and their relationships and indeed entire organizations and
living communities. Even if it is the rigidity of the triangular form of
each face of the polyhedron defining any such dome that gives these
shapes their stability and strength, the feature on which I rely in treat-
ing the domes as suitable metaphors for a distinctive mode of rights
construction is the protective convex covering that the domes provide
to the plane on which they rest. This image should bring to mind the
notion of "penumbral" or peripheral rights to which Justice Douglas's
opinion for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticue° referred-rights rec-
ognized (or, in truth, boldly posited)-to prevent the "specific rights"
purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the
person offering to sell.... In all such particulars the employer and the employ6 have equality of
right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty
of contract which no government can legally justify in a free land." (quoting Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908))).
20 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) ("[Certain] cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill
of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance." (citing Poe v. Ullman, 376 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing))).
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expressly identified and enumerated in constitutional texts from be-
coming "less secure."
"Rights" so conceived would appear to describe claims of a less in-
trinsic or foundational and more purely instrumental character than
seems the case with respect to rights geometrically extrapolated; or-
dinarily, at least, the rights lying atop any protective scaffolding or
shield present themselves as contingent in character, provisional as
well as prophylactic, recognized not as intrinsically valuable in the
way that core, or primary, rights tend to be but as essentially instru-
mental and ancillary, and thus presumptively subject to legislative re-
placement with differently designed protective structures, provided
only that those alternative structures be equally effective, by some
suitably administered measure, in securing the underlying rights at
stake. One need only recall Chief Justice Warren's construction of
the prophylactic Miranda warnings the Court required the govern-
ment to follow unless and until something as effective (by the Court's
own lights) in preventing coercive custodial interrogation were to be
legislatively enacted, in order to make real the theoretical right set
out in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.21
In one recent case, however-Dickerson v. United State 22 -a lop-
sided majority of the Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice Rehnquist,
treated the Miranda rules-despite their avowedly prophylactic pur-
pose and the express recognition that Congress remained free to re-
place them with equally effective alternatives-as "constitutional" in
character.2 The Court derived that characterization not from a re-
newed examination and reaffirmation of the legitimacy of the
Miranda Court's imposition of the required warnings upon state as
well as federal law enforcement and adjudication but from a herme-
neutical exegesis of how the Court, both in Miranda itself and in suc-
ceeding cases, had described the rules and applied them in a manner
that the Supreme Court's purely supervisory power over the federal
judicial system could not have justified.
24
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) ("[T]he Constitution does not require any
specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custo-
dial interrogation. Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the
privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in informing accused
persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.").
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
23 See id. at 432 ("Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect
overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.").
24 See id. at 437-41 (noting that the Court's practice of applying Miranda protections to state
court prosecutions could be legitimated solely as a means of enforcing the Federal Constitu-
tion).
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Having concluded that Miranda's rules had therefore been pro-
nounced, rightly or wrongly, in the Constitution's name and in the
Court's constitutional voice, the Dickerson Court treated as automati-
cally unconstitutional a congressional measure purporting simply to
repeal Miranda and to replace its rules, not with an alternative pro-
phylactic regime, but with a return to case-by-case assessment of each
confession's voluntariness, in effect viewing Congress's effrontery in
daring to disagree with the Court's conclusion as to the necessity of
its geodesic constitutional construct as sufficient to condemn Con-
gress's action as unconstitutional even before addressing the continu-
ing validity of the Miranda precedent as a matter of constitutional
law.25 Turning to that issue, the Court quickly concluded that consid-
erations of stare decisis carried the daY and accordingly declined to re-
visit Miranda's constitutional validity.
In dissent, Justice Scalia expressed understandable outrage at
what he deemed worse than "a milestone of judicial overreaching,"
calling the Court's approach the apex of 'Judicial arrogance."27 More
relevant here, Justice Scalia categorically denied the legitimacy of any
purportedly "constitutional" rules that are purely prophylactic and
provisional in character.2 8 He therefore dismissed examples drawn
from judicially-derived procedural free speech protection (such as
the rules constraining the substantive and evidentiary criteria sur-
rounding defamation suits, or the rules constraining the allocation of
burdens of proof in matters affecting anti-government speech) and
similar areas as readily distinguishable on the ground that the Court
had in those instances found the particular rules in question to be
logically necessary parts of the underlying constitutional rights and
not merely discretionary rules for implementing those rights in a
comparatively efficacious manner.29
As Justice Scalia saw the matter, the role of crafting implementing
or instrumental rules of that sort-rules ancillary to specific constitu-
tional rights but not conceptualized as intrinsic to those rights-was
25 See id. at 444 ("In sum, we conclude that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that
Congress may not supersede legislatively.").
26 See id. at 443 ("Whether or not we agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting
rule... the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.").
27 Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 See id. at 454 ("[W]hat makes a decision 'constitutional' in the only sense relevant
here ... is the determination that the Constitution requires the result that the decision an-
nounces and the statute ignores. By disregarding congressional action that concededly does
not violate the Constitution, the Court flagrantly offends fundamental principles of separation
of powers, and arrogates to itself prerogatives reserved to the representatives of the people.").
29 See, e.g., id. at 459-60 ("In these cases, and others involving the First Amendment, the
Court has acknowledged that in order to guarantee that protected speech is not 'chilled' and
thus forgone, it is in some instances necessary to incorporate in our substantive rules 'a measure
of strategic protection.'").
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quintessentially legislative rather than judicial in character. He em-
phasized that Article III contains no analogue to the enforcement
clauses of the Fourteenth and several other Amendments empower-
ing the judicial branch to sculpt what I have here called geodesic su-
perstructures to surround and effectuate the underlying rights.3 ' And
he argued that, to the degree the enforcement powers entrusted to
Congress by these Amendments are properly understood to include
authority to create purely prophylactic prohibitions-something he
questioned in a later dissent 2-those powers, in recognition of their
extraordinary nature, have been judicially cabined by requirements
of congruence and proportionality of a sort that neither the Miranda
Court nor the Dickerson Court saw fit to impose on itself.
33
It seems fair to say that Justice Scalia, in contrast to the Justices
joining the Rehnquist majority in Dickerson, regarded the process of
layering implementing rules like those of Miranda over the core con-
stitutional requirements that those rules are meant to enforce-
there, the requirement that criminally incriminating statements not
be involuntarily extracted for trial use against an accused-as consti-
tutionally legitimate, if at all, only as a properly constrained exercise
of sub-constitutional lawmaking power, and never as a matter of in-
ference directly from the Constitution itself.
In some tension with his objection to the high-handed and hege-
monic nature of the Court's claim to automatic supremacy over Con-
gress in matters of constitutional construction, Justice Scalia seemed
to be taking the position that a genuinely "constitutional" rule must
invariably have a necessary rather than contingent, a permanent
rather than provisional, character, and can never be adopted judi-
cially as merely the best available means of avoiding core constitu-
tional violations unless and until legislatively supplanted by some-
thing equally efficacious.
Consider what this construct would imply for the right of an inter-
ested listener or viewer to receive, without government inhibition
based on content, the views and information that a willing (even if
30 "[W]hat today's decision will stand for, whether the Justices can bring themselves to say it
or not, is the power of the Supreme Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitu-
tion, binding on Congress and the States." Id. at 461.
31 Id. at 460-61 ("Where the Constitution has wished to lodge in one of the branches of the
Federal Government some limited power to supplement its guarantees, it has said so.") (citing
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5).
82 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 558-59 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deeming prophy-
lactic legislation "reinforcement rather than enforcement" and thus violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
33 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 460-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The power with which the Court
would endow itself under a 'prophylactic' justification for Miranda goes far beyond what it has
permitted Congress to do under authority of that text." (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 520 (1997))).
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constitutionally unprotected by virtue of extraterritoriality) speaker
chooses to transmit. This "right to receive information" is a right that
Justice Brennan, concurring in Lamont v. Postmaster General, point-
edly described in terms suggesting that he was at the time laying the
groundwork for recognizing a "right to privacy" as among the "pen-
umbral" unenumerated rights in the then-pending case of Griswold v.
Connecticut. Such a "right" would seemingly count as sufficiently es-
sential to any coherent version of the "freedom of speech" to escape
condemnation under the strict test enunciated in Justice Scalia's
Dickerson dissent. If that is so, then what Justice Brennan, at least,
seemed prepared to describe as an "unenumerated" right-the right
to receive information from a willing speaker-would appear to survive
the Scalia test. But it would survive that test only because, in the
Scalia scheme of things, that right was not truly an instance of an
"unenumerated" right at all but was instead merely a logical entail-
ment of a solidly enumerated right to free speech.
In Justice Scalia's tightly constricted universe, "geodesically" con-
structed rights, if they are rights at all, must therefore collapse into
logical derivations from rights that are firmly enumerated-and in
that sense must amount to relatively trivial instances of "geometri-
cally" derived straight-line extrapolations located on the same plane
as the rights from which they stem. Otherwise, such constructs would
represent nothing more than improperly legislated pretenders to the
status of "unenumerated" constitutional rights, lacking all legal le-
gitimacy.
For all its rhetorical force, one must remember that Justice
Scalia's was, of course, but a proposed counter-universe. The legal
world as understood by the Dickerson majority left room for geodesi-
cally constructed constitutional rights that could not be geometrically
extrapolated as necessary entailments of rights properly described as
textually "enumerated." That such rights remain subject in theory to
alternative enforcement regimes-although not, plainly, to a naked
congressional decision to ditch them without substituting anything
beyond what the Court had already found wanting-means that they
are not directly derivable from rights of unquestioned textual pedi-
gree. But if the relationship of these "unenumerated" rights to rights
of such pedigree is a relationship of means to ends, at least it seems
plain that the contours of that relationship were not viewed in
Dickerson as too indeterminate to permit judicial determination of
when the rights have been sufficiently if alternatively protected or of
who bore an obligation to protect them.
34 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (finding the requirement that an addressee request in writing
the delivery of certain literature to be an unacceptable burden on First Amendment fights).
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Of quite a different character would be such material guarantees
as those purportedly ensuring minimally adequate shelter, nutrition,
health care, or occupational or educational opportunity. Enforcing
such guarantees would no doubt facilitate, and would certainly ren-
der more meaningful, such enumerated rights as the right to speak
one's mind or the right to practice one's religion, and such more
readily extrapolated rights as the right to cast an equal vote. Thus
these material guarantees would seem to fall within the theoretical
reach of the geodesic method and hence to constitute potential can-
didates for recognition as unenumerated constitutional rights. Yet
the irreducible indeterminacy of the inquiry into whose responsibility
it is to fulfill these rights, and of the inquiry into when these rights
are to be deemed fulfilled, makes quite implausible-in anything re-
sembling today's American constitutional culture M-the proposition
that such rights are constitutionally enshrined.
Considerably less attenuated in today's constitutional universe is
the set of what might aptly be regarded as the "unenumerated" rights
of state and local governments. Think, for instance, of Justice
O'Connor's and Justice Kennedy's frequent exhortations about how
our federalism "split the atom of sovereignty, '36 in the latter's felici-
tous phrase, not as an end in itself but as a means of giving double
security to individual citizens' rights against overbearing government.
Given Chief Justice Rehnquist's evocative reference to the "tacit pos-
tulates" of the "constitutional plan 3 7 in describing the precepts of
federalism-and given the general recognition that nothing in the
Constitution's text points to, much less "enumerates," many of the
"states' rights" recognized by the Rehnquist Court and bound to be
preserved or extended in the jurisprudence of the Roberts Court-
should one not view the "rights" of the quasi-sovereign states-for in-
stance, their rights not to be "commandeered" in the exercise of their
38 39 40lawmaking, executive, or adjudicatory functions -as amenable to
geodesic, even if not geometric, construction?
Cf S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. II, §§ 24-29, reprinted in 16 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD 15-18 (2004) (providing for economic and social rights including the right to a
secure environment, adequate housing, health care, food, water, social security, and educa-
tion); Mattias Kumm, Constitutional Rights as Principles: On the Structure and Domain of Constitu-
tional Justice, 2 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 574, 586 (2004) (book review) (noting that the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court has interpreted German Basic Law to provide social rights such as
minimum subsistence as furthering "the necessary preconditions for the meaningful realization
of liberties" (citing ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 334-48 (Julian Rivers
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1986))).
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (KennedyJ, concurring).
37 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) ("Congress may not simply 'com-
mandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and en-
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The opinions of the four Justices who have dissented from nearly
all of the decisions establishing such rights-insisting that such rights
need no judicial protection because the political process suffices to
guarantee their survival, 4' need protection of a much thinner and
more deferential variety in light of the empirical uncertainties sur-
rounding how best to realize federalism's aspirations,42 or no longer
43make sense at all as "rights" in light of contemporary realities 4-seem
to me thinly veiled denials that geodesically derived rights of this sort,
once one concedes their contingent rather than inevitable character,
ever deserve to be included in the "unenumerated rights" pantheon.
force a federal regulatory program.'" (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))).
39 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("Congress cannot circumvent th[e]
prohibition [against compelling a state to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program] by
conscripting the States' officers directly.").
40 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999) ("[The Court] ha[s] discovered no instance in
which [an early Congress] purported to authorize suits against nonconsenting States in [state
courts].").
41 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter,J.,joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, & Breyer, J.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Founders had concluded in their "con-
sideredjudgment that politics, not judicial review, should mediate between state and national
interests as the strength and legislative jurisdiction of the National Government inevitably in-
creased through the expected growth of the national economy"); id. at 661 (Breyer, J., joined in
this part by Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "Congress, when it enacted the statute, followed
procedures that help to protect the federalism values at stake. It provided adequate notice to
the States of its intent to legislate in an 'are [a] of traditional state regulation.'" (citing id. at 615
(majority opinion))); Printz, 521 U.S. at 957 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer,
J.J., dissenting) ("The majority points to nothing suggesting that the political safeguards of fed-
eralism identified in Garcia need be supplemented by a rule, grounded in neither constitutional
history nor text, flatly prohibiting the National Government from enlisting state and local offi-
cials in the implementation of federal law."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's deference to congressional invocations of the
Commerce Clause reflects its "appreciation of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's politi-
cal accountability in dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible choices").
42 See, e.g, Printz, 521 U.S. at 976-77 (Breyer, J.,joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing
that "[a]t least some other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local con-
trol is better maintained through application of a principle that is the direct opposite of the
principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution. The federal systems of Swit-
zerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide that constituent states,
not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or
decrees enacted by the central 'federal' body.... They do so in part because they believe that
such a system interferes less, nor more, with the independent authority of the 'state,' member
nation, or other subsidiary government, and helps to safeguard individual liberty as well.").
43 See generally Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 395 (1995) (developing the thesis that fidelity to original constitutional meaning, pur-
posively understood, often requires translating the way an original text had been read so that
the translated "reading" is more faithful to the original meaning of the provision or principle in
question, given altered circumstances and contexts, than the original "reading" would have
been).
44 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 763 (Souter, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's holding as
"a conception necessarily implied by statehood itself... [that] is... not one of common law so
much as of natural law, a universally applicable proposition discoverable by reason").
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As such, those dissents leave much to be desired--even when the ma-
jority opinions against which they are cast are conspicuously unre-
sponsive to the dissenters' claims, and even when one might in the
end find some of the majority's holdings unconvincing.
45
Although I have discussed constitutionally unenumerated rights of
state governments in terms of the geodesic model, it would be a mis-
take to regard that model as necessarily the most powerful in under-
standing the structure and derivation of those rights. On the con-
trary, such rights might well be understood best either in terms of
what I would call the geological model or in terms of what I would
describe as the monster-barring or slope-avoiding model.
GEOLOGICAL: The third form of rights construction-although in
this instance perhaps a better term would be deconstruction-entails
neither geometrically linking enumerated rights nor extrapolating
from such rights, on the one hand, nor geodesically constructing
shields for their protection, on the other. Instead, it involves digging
beneath a recognized enumerated right or set of rights so as to un-
earth the logical or sociological presuppositions of those rights, the
postulates they should be understood to reflect, or the underlying
(typically more substantive) rights without which the rights enumer-
ated (often more procedural or quasi-procedural in cast) would be
rendered incoherent or largely purposeless. Recall Justice Harlan's
suggestion, in his Poe v. Uliman dissent, that the Fourth Amendment's
various search-and-seizure-related protections for "the right of the
people to be secure in their... houses, 6 would make little or no
sense but for an underlying "solicitude to protect the privacies of the
life within.,
47
In much that spirit, in my oral argument representing Michael
Hardwick, who had been arrested for engaging in consensual sex at
home with another man in Bowers v. Hardwick, I suggested that the
Third Amendment's protection against "quarter[ing] [regiments of
soldiers] in any house, without the consent of the Owner," 8 would
make little sense if there were no substantive limit whatever on the
45 See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does The Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend
the Future---or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARv. L. REV. 110, 139-41 (1999) (noting
that although Justice Stevens criticized the majority in Printz v. United States for selectively em-
ploying "unconstrained modes of structural inference," it is likely that "in the current era,
claims of individual rights are most likely to have power and ultimately to prevail if they can be
convincingly expressed through the language, and clearly understood through the logic, of
such concretely architectural features of the Constitution as the separation of powers or, more
to the point here, the federal system of separate, equal, and semi-autonomous states").
46 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
48 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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authority enjoyed by the state to regiment every last detail of what the
owner did behind closed doors in the privacy of that home.49
Rights that bear substantively on the allocation of decision-making
authority with respect to particular realms or domains of life-if their
assumed, but not textually articulated, existence is arguably neces-
sary, in a given time and place, to render purposeful one or more of
the rights that are articulated in the constitutional text-would seem
to be prime candidates for the unenumerated rights "retained by the
people" to which the Ninth Amendment refers. We might disagree
that one or another specific allocation of decision-making roles-with
respect to reproductive choice, to take a prominent instance, or with
respect to end-of-life decisions, to posit another-is indeed necessary
to render various enumerated rights meaningful, to prevent them
from being mere hollow shells, but there should be wide agreement
that the inquiry into such necessity represents the crucial step in a
distinctly "geological" approach to identifying something as an un-
enumerated but constitutionally protected right.
Failure to make a convincing case for a given right's necessity in
these terms means, by definition, that the geological method fails to
generate the right in question. It does not necessarily mean that the
contested right cannot be otherwise generated. In particular, the
fourth form of rights derivation-the method that focuses on "mon-
ster-barring" or slippery-slope avoidance-might yet furnish a persua-
sive basis for admitting a claimed right into the unenumerated rights
universe. We turn, then, to:
MONSTER-BARRING: This form of rights construction employs a
method for which I have borrowed a label from the mathematical lo-
gician, Imre Lakatos, whose 1976 book, Proofs and Refutations: The
Logic of Mathematical Discovery, uses that label to describe (and to criti-
cize) the mode of reasoning in which one approaches mathematical
proof by pretending that counterexamples to supposed truths are not
genuine counterexamples but "monsters" that can simply be ig-
nored.50 As I use the term here, "monster-barring" entails rejecting as
unconstitutional any government action whose constitutional legiti-
macy we could accept only at the monstrous price of treating some
established constitutional boundary or limitation as entirely empty or
wholly ineffectual.
49 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140),
reprinted in 164 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1985 TERM SUPPLEMENT 653 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Cas-
per eds., 1987).
50 For further discussion of Lakatos's monster-barring approach and its relationship to law,
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 88-92 (1991).
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Witness Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion in United States v. Lo-
pez5 that giving one's constitutional blessing to the congressional ban
on possession of firearms near schools would in principle commit
one to accept the constitutional legitimacy, at least insofar as affirma-
tive authority is concerned, of literally any assertion of congressional
power over any aspect of life.52 The Chief Justice's majority opinion
in that case challenges the dissenters to propose a limiting principle
that might provide some purchase along an otherwise limitlessly slip-
pery slope. The majority treats the dissenters' failure to propose such
a principle as proof that only a right to avoid congressional regula-
tion of the type there involved could serve to forestall the monstrous
outcome of essentially erasing the Tenth Amendment and repudiat-
ing the generally accepted axiom the Amendment expresses-to wit,
that ours is a government of limited national powers.
Just so, it may well be that the strongest argument for treating cer-
tain intimate realms of personal choice as implicating unenumerated
constitutional rights is the monster-barring argument that, if one
were to cede to government the authority to intrude willy-nilly, and
without any particularly compelling justification, into the realms in
question, one would in essence have ceded to government powers so
boundless as to efface the very idea of personal rights, leaving virtu-
ally nothing beyond the reach of government.
Nor need unenumerated rights so constructed be expressed as
substantive spheres of conduct or forms of relationship that the logic
of monster-barring puts presumptively beyond the reach of govern-
mental power to forbid, to mandate, or to shape. Similar in structure
would be an argument that permitting government to regulate some
particular aspect of life along a specific axis, in a particular manner,
in terms of a given variable, or in service of a particular value or end,
would be tantamount to erasing a vital constraint on permissible gov-
ernment action that we have agreed the Constitution enumerates. In
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,5 for example, I represented a restaurant
in challenging a Massachusetts law that empowered churches to wield
over businesses operating in their immediate vicinity a form of gov-
ernmental authority-there, a veto over a commercial activity (serv-
ing liquor to customers)-that had been preferentially delegated to
such churches (and to selected others but not to all institutions simi-
larly situated). The Court was persuaded that sustaining the constitu-
tional legitimacy of that preferential delegation of secular power to
51 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
52 Id. at 564 ("Under the theories that the Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law en-
forcement or education where States historically have been sovereign.").
5 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
[Vol. 9:2
REFLECTIONS
religious institutions would for all practical purposes have eliminated
the anti-establishment principle in its entirety from the array of con-
stitutional constraints on government.
5 4
The unenumerated rights that emerge from geometric, geodesic,
geological, and monster-barring constructions may take many forms.
They may be procedural or substantive, individual or structural, in-
tensely controversial or widely accepted. Some of these rights may be
cognizable not merely as the product of a single one of these tech-
niques, but as the overlapping or converging result of multiple meth-
ods of rights construction. For example, the anti-commandeering
holdings of New York v. United States5 5 and Printz v. United StateS
6 -
whose grounding in the history of the founding the dissenters in
those cases fairly demolished-might rest more comfortably either on
the geodesic notion that politically transparent separation between
dual sovereigns guards other liberties protected in the Constitution,
or on the monster-barring argument that upholding the federal di-
rectives at issue in those cases would have reduced state and local ju-
risdictions to little more than field offices of an all-powerful central
government, a consequence difficult to square with the Constitution's
"tacit postulates" regarding at least a modicum of state sovereignty.
My intention in this exploratory essay has not been to defend any
particular mode of rights construction over any other, to extol the
virtues of the entire enterprise over its well-known difficulties, or to
champion the inclusion of one or another personal or governmental
right in-or the exclusion of any particular right from-the "unenu-
merated" rights canon. Although my previous writings have frankly
embraced organic and evolutionary over mechanistic and static con-
ceptions of constitutional interpretation, this Essay is not intended as
an attempt to claim constitutional status for any particular subset of
the historic landmarks punctuating our political and moral develop-
ment as a nation that find no explicit reflection in the text of the
written Constitution.
Only a false equation between the Constitution's evolving con-
tents and the ever-changing measure of how government ideally
ought to behave and what it ought ideally to avoid doing could foster
the fallacy that "unenumerated rights" or the "unwritten constitu-
tion" define whatever it might take to fill the sometimes yawning gap
between what the constitutional text tells us and what counts as fun-
damental about our political and legal morality at each phase in our
national evolution. In attempting to develop a taxonomy for the
Id. at 126 ("This statute enmeshes churches in the exercise of substantial governmental
powers contrary to our consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause ...
55 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
56 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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available methods of deriving and structuring the rights that the Con-
stitution supports but does not enumerate, I have not sought to close
that gap or to erase the fundamental distinction between what our
polity accepts as just or condemns as indecent and what its Constitu-
tion mandates, permits or forbids.
On the contrary, it is precisely our Constitution's memorialization
of such practices as slavery, and our tradition of never erasing what-
ever the Constitution might at one time have inscribed-however
shameful its doing so may have been-that constitutes one of the
greatest virtues of its written character and of its adherence to the
poet's dictum that "The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on."" That so much of our Constitution as is expressed in
writing continues permanently to register even outdated and since
repudiated traces of its compromises with expediency and with evil is
an antidote against the temptations of collective forgetting. The
Constitution's writtenness ensures that the darkest episodes of our
past-insofar as they have found expression in the Constitution's
text-cannot be airbrushed from our history. And it ensures as well
that we never lose sight of the distinction between what the Constitu-
tion, written or unwritten, permits or demands and what common
decency and wise statecraft might require. That is the meaning, in
constitutional discourse, of the poet's reminder: "nor all your Piety
nor Wit Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all your Tears
wash out a Word of it."
58
Pathbreaking acts of Congress and other potentially more transi-
tory expressions of our national struggle, however much they some-
times contribute to the growing recognition of one or another un-
enumerated right as grounded in the Constitution, however much
they may count as vital stepping stones along the legal path of the na-
tion's development, and however entrenched they might in practice
become in our history and tradition, all remain subject, should they
ever be repealed, to total erasure from the enacted annals of our le-
gal past. Such federal statutes and other collective expressions of our
national will thus remain worth distinguishing from the Constitution
proper, both in its glacially changing written projections and in its
more fluid and volatile unwritten premises. My aim in this brief Essay
has been to dissect the ways in which those more fluid but still consti-
tutionally grounded unwritten premises may be connected to, and
may be understood as arising from, the written text itself.
57 THE RUBAtYAT OF OMAR KHAYAM verse 71, at 106 (Christopher Decker ed., Edward Fitz-
Gerald trans., Univ. Press of Va. 1997) (1879).
58 Id.
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